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TITLE SEARCHES: TORT LIABILITY
IN CALIFORNIA
Title insurance companies in California play a vital part in what
is generally the most significant investment of a layman's life-his
investment in a home.' In such situations the buyer understandably
needs assurance that he is getting good title. Customarily the vendor
or his agent procures a preliminary report of title and makes it
available to prospective buyers. The buyer by perusal of this report
becomes acquainted with the present state of title. If he is satisfied,
the sale is consummated with the procurement of a policy of title
insurance.2 The title insurance generally issues from the company
that prepares the preliminary report and it insures the title as por-
trayed in that report.'
This comment deals with the liability of a title company, apart
from the contract of insurance, for negligently prepared preliminary
reports. More specifically, it focuses upon the liability of a title
company to third parties-those not in privity with the title com-
pany. In the normal land sale transaction a vendee is a third party
since usually the contract to search is between the vendor or his
agent and the title company. The comment also discusses the emerg-
ing trends in the law of negligent misrepresentation in analogous
fields where there are contractual undertakings that generally affect
third parties. Finally, the effect of exculpatory clauses and other
methods of limiting liability is explored.
To minimize terminological misunderstandings, note that Cali-
fornia courts refer to preliminary reports as abstracts of title, and
to title companies (in their searching capacity) as abstracters.4 All
such references in this comment are consistent with the judicial use.
THE NATURE OF THE DUTY
Contract Liability
Traditionally, the contract of employment limited the duty to
search the records.' The employer of the abstracter had a cause of
action in contract for negligent search where he suffered damage as
1 See Comment, 39 CALIF. L. R v. 235, 245 (1951).
2 See generally ibid.
3 See generally Comment, 39 CALiF. L. REv. 235 (1951) to effect that searching
the records in itself is seemingly not remunerative.
4 See, e.g., Viotti v. Giomi, 230 Cal. App. 2d 730, 41 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1964);
Hawkins v. Oakland Title & Guar. Co., 165 Cal. App. 2d 116, 331 P.2d 742 (1958);
J. H. Trisdale Inc. v. Shasta County Title Co., 146 Cal. App. 2d 831, 304 P.2d 832
(1956).
5 Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
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a proximate result of the abstracter's negligence. The negligence
was viewed as the breach of the employer-abstracter contract and
the delivery of a negligent abstract as evidence of the breach.' How-
ever, unless a person relying on the abstract could relate himself to
the employer-abstracter contract on a valid contractual theory, he
had no remedy against the abstracter.
The inequity of restricting the liability of abstracters or title
companies to their contract of employment manifests itself in the
decided cases. For example, V, intending to sell his land, procures apreliminary report from a title company. P purchases the land rely-ing on the state of the title evidenced by the report. P later finds out
that certain encumbrances actually existing on the property were
omitted through the negligence of the title company and he is forced
to discharge them. P, according to the weight of authority in the
United States, has no cause of action against the title company
because of lack of privity.'
Origin of Contract Liability
The case of Savings Bank v. Ward,8 decided in 1879, limited
the liability of an abstracter to his contract of employment. The
tenacity of stare decisis has preserved that doctrine to the present
day. Decisions supporting the doctrine "speak the language of a
time, when courts obliged to choose, were prone to prefer legal form
before justice, and when the abstracter played little, if any, part inbusiness negotiations."9 The public today is vitally concerned in
securing dependable knowledge of titles, and since title companies
have practically pre-empted the field of record searching, it is not
unduly harsh to impose upon them a standard of reasonable care
demanding skillfully prepared abstracts.
Liability in Tort
The landmark case of Ultramares v. Touche'° in 1931 refused
to hold a public accountant liable in tort to a third party not inprivity who incurred financial loss as a result of the accountant's
negligent misrepresentation in the preparation of a balance sheet.
The majority opinion, written by Justice Cardozo, said that, as a
matter of public policy, accountants should not be exposed "to a
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to
6 Lattin v. Gilette, 95 Cal. 317, 30 Pac. 545 (1892).
7 Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v.
Continental Oil Co., 43 Ariz. 219, 29 P.2d 1065 (1934).
8 100 U.S. 195 (1879).
9 Trusler, Extension of Liability of Abstracters, 18 Micn. L. REv. 128 (1919).10 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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an indeterminate class."" Justice Cardozo refused to allow the assault
on the citadel of privity. As long as public policy favored limited
liability for negligent acts arising out of contractual relationships
the concept of privity could be advanced as grounds for a decision.' 2
Public policy today, however, favors an imposition of duty on
those people who hold themselves out to the public as possessing
certain skills notwithstanding lack of privity. Thus, Biakanja v.
Irving"5 held a notary public liable in tort to a third party damaged
by the notary's negligence in drawing up a will. New York, subse-
quent to Ultramares v. Touche, has held a certified public accountant
liable in tort to a third party not in privity for negligence in the
preparation of a balance sheet. 4 In Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of
Chattanooga," a federal court in Tennessee held consulting engi-
neers, who made drawings for the city, liable in tort to a subcontrac-
tor who based his price for digging a sewer on the drawings. There
was no privity. In California a soil tester for Central Contra Costa
Sanitation District was held liable in tort to a third party who bid on
the basis of the soil tests, despite lack of privity."
The aforementioned cases illustrate that not only will an action
lie where a misrepresentation arising out of contract rests on negli-
gence, but also that the action may be maintained by a member of
a class of persons whom the act may forseeably affect rather than
just those in privity. The concept of privity is seemingly giving way
to public policy considerations of the proper scope of liability. It is
submitted that a title company in preparing preliminary reports is
no different than a soil tester, who knows that his tests will be relied
upon by prospective bidders, and that in accord with emerging
negligence law, title companies-as searchers-should be held to a
standard of reasonable care to a foreseeable class.
THE TREND IN CALIFORNIA
The theory of contract as the sole basis of liability for negligent
search was abandoned in the case of J. H. Trisdale Inc. v. Shasta
County Title Co.' in 1956. A third party was not involved. That
11 Id. at -, 174 N.E. at 444.
12 See Note, 48 VA. L. REv. 1476 (1962); Note, 16 VAND. L. RaV. 266 (1962).
13 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
14 Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d 20 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd mem.
285 App. Div. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1955). An attempt was made to distinguish
this case from Ultramares v. Touche, Niven & Co.; the unequivocal certification
seems to have been the decisive factor in imposing liability. There was no fraud shown
however.
15 204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
16 M. Miller Co. v. Dames & Moore, 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13
(1961).
17 146 Cal. App. 2d 831, 304 P.2d 832 (1956).
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case involved a misdescription of an easement of record by the title
company in a preliminary title report. The report described the
easement as belonging to Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company
when in fact it belonged to Pacific Gas and Electric. In overruling a
demurrer for failure to state a cause of action in negligence that
court said: "it would be strange, indeed, if prospective purchasers of
real property could not rely on title reports for which they are re-
quired to pay, but must search the records themselves. If such be the
law a large part of the value of title companies would disappear.' 8
The case of Hawkins v. Oakland Title & Guarantee Co.,19
decided in 1958, confirmed and expanded the tort liability suggested
in Trisdale. A third party was not involved, there being the requisite
privity between Hawkins and the title company. The case involved
the omission by a title company in its preliminary report, of a
grant of access rights to the State of California. The grant was of
record. The purchaser upon acquiring the property built a service
station worth $25,000 in reliance on the accuracy of the preliminary
report. The court, citing Trisdale as authority, reversed the sustain-
ing of a demurrer in the lower court for failure to state a cause of
action in negligence. In delineating the duty owed by a title company
in searching the records, Hawkins viewed section 552 of the Restate-
ment of Torts as determinative.2" This section reads:
One who in the course of his business or profession supplies information
for the guidance of others in their business transactions is subject to
liability for harm caused to them by their reliance upon the information
if
(a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in obtaining and
communicating the information which its recipient is justified in
expecting and
(b) the harm is suffered (i) by the person or one of the class of
persons for whose guidance the information was supplied, and (ii)
because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a transaction in which
it was intended to influence his conduct or in a transaction sub-
stantially identical therewith. 21
It is readily apparent that the elements of section 552 are present
where a title company prepares a preliminary report for a vendor of
land or his agent. The title company furnishes reports expressly for
the guidance of purchasers. It can hardly be asserted that reliance on
the reports is unjustifiable since the existence of an abstract or title
report is directed to achieve reliance and nothing else. The foresee-
ability of harm to purchasers as a class is chargeable to the title
18 Id. at 839, 304 P.2d at 837.
19 165 Cal. App. 2d 116, 331 P.2d 742 (1958).
20 Id. at 126, 331 P.2d at 747.
21 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 552 (1938).
[Vol. 7
TITLE SEARCHES
company, since it in fact is aware that purchasers are generally the
beneficiaries of its contract with the vendor.
The official comments to section 552 seem especially applicable
in defining the care required in searching the record and to whom the
duty of care extends. Part of comment (e) reads: "If the matter is
one which requires investigation, the supplier of the information
must exercise reasonable care and competence to ascertain the facts
on which his statement is based. '22 Comment (g) is as follows: "It
is enough that the information is supplied for repetition to a particu-
lar class of persons and that the person relying on it is one of the
class."23 If section 552 of the Restatement determines the scope of
a title searcher's liability, and Hawkins seems to indicate that such is
the case, there is a liability to third parties not in privity.
Since, however, the Hawkins case did not involve a third party,
the scope of 552, as binding authority, must be limited to the facts
of that case. Viotti v. Giomi,"4 decided in 1964, commenting on lia-
bility for negligent search said: "recovery is now permitted either
on the basis of contract or tort ' 25 and cited Hawkins as authority.
The Viotti case did not involve a third party.
EXTENSION OF TORT LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES
The tort duty announced in Trisdale, developed in Hawkins,
and confirmed in Viotti has not been extensively defined. Although
third parties were not plaintiffs in these cases, the language used by
the courts, especially in Hawkins, seems broad enough to encompass
them. How a third party will fare in such a suit remains to be seen.
In view of the fact that it is customary for vendors to procure pre-
liminary reports, thereby making the purchaser a third party vis-A-
vis the title company, and considering the fact that title companies
know that their expertise will be relied upon by purchasers and not
vendors, it can reasonably be expected that recovery will be allowed.
Public policy considerations of the proper scope of liability have
changed significantly since Ultramares v. Touche. This change is
amply illustrated in the cases from analogous fields-e.g., soil tester,
notary public, consulting engineers-that impose liability despite
lack of privity.
THE EFFECT OF EXCULPATORY CLAUSES
The words "Preliminary report only-no liability hereunder" or
"Liability hereunder limited to consideration paid" generally appear
22 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 552, comment e (1938).
23 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 552, comment g (1938).
24 230 Cal. App. 2d 730, 41 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1964).
25 Id. at 739, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 350-51.
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conspicuously on preliminary reports. If by these clauses a title
company is permitted to avoid liability for its negligent acts, the
purchaser may rely on a title report only at his peril. Such words of
exculpation on a litigation report were held not sufficient to excuse
a title company for its negligence in Viotti v. Giomi 6 The California
Supreme Court in Trunkl v. Regents of University of California,27
in invalidating an exculpatory clause in an agreement signed by
plaintiff prior to admission to a hospital, suggested an outline of
these transactions in which attempts at exculpation would be in-
effective. Such a transaction
exhibits some or all of the following characteristics. It concerns
a business of a type generally thought suitable for public regulation.
The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a service of
great importance to the public which is often a matter of practical
necessity for some members of the public. The party holds himself
out as willing to perform this service for any member of the public
who seeks it, or at least for any member coming within certain
established standards. As a result of the essential nature of service, in
the economic setting of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation
possesses a decisive advantage of bargaining strength against any
member of the public who seeks his services. In exercising a superior
bargaining power the party confronts the public with a standardized
adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a
purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection
against negligence. Finally as a result of the transaction, the person
or property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller,
subject to the risk of carelessness by the seller or his agents.28
That the case of a title company in its searching capacity falls within
the Trunkl doctrine seems unquestionable. A vendor who wishes to
sell his home generally has no alternative but to approach a title
company if he wants a report on the state of his title. 2' The vendor
may not dictate the terms under which such a report issues. It is
quite probable that a demand for terms, other than those on the
printed form, would be unavailing. The court in invalidating the
exculpatory clause in Viotti seems to indicate, in line with Trunkl,
that public policy will not tolerate such evasions of liability. Since
however, neither Trunkl nor Viotti involved third parties, the ques-
tion of whether third parties are contemplated in the Trunkl doctrine
has not yet been decided. If however the inequality of bargaining
positions renders the excupatory clause void as against the party in
privity, a fortiori a purchaser, who is forced to accept the report
without any chance to object to the format, is entitled to protection.
This is especially so since title companies cannot realistically assert
26 Id. at 739, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
27 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 37 (1963).
28 Id. at 98-101, 383 P.2d at 445-46, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 37-38. (Emphasis added.)
29 See Comment, 71 YALE L. REV. 1161, 1171 & n.59 (1962).
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lack of knowledge of the customary practice in real estate trans-
actions, namely that the purchaser is really the party for whom the
report is prepared regardless of the source of the consideration. It
is submitted that since title companies perform such a vital public
function and occupy such a superior bargaining power vis-h-vis the
lay public, that as a matter of law exculpatory clauses should be
ineffective to disavow liability.
Effect of Provision Ten in the Conditions and Stipulations of the
California Land Title Association Standard Coverage Policy of
Title Insurance30
The great majority of land sale transactions in California culmi-
nate with the issuance of a policy of title insurance. The purchaser
usually pays for this policy which insures the title shown in the
preliminary report. Provision ten of the conditions and stipulations
of the standard coverage policy reads in part:
Any action or actions or rights of action that the insured may have or
may bring against the Company arising out of the title of the estate or
interest insured herein must be based on the provisions of this policy.
No provision or condition of this policy can be waived or changed
except by the writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed by the
President, a Vice President, the Secretary, an Assistant Secretary or
other validating officer of the Company.31
The effect of this provision may differ according to the person who
orders the preliminary report. For example, where the vendor orders
the report, the contract to search is between the vendor and the
title company. Under present law the purchaser may not recover for
negligent search for lack of privity. Therefore any cause of action of
the purchaser is on the contract or insurance. If liability in tort
extends to third parties, then section ten attempts to evade that
liability. Similarly section ten attempts to evade tort liability where
the purchaser orders the preliminary report. The institution of a tort
libility will be to no avail and its extension to third parties meaning-
less if title companies, by their superior bargaining position, may
circumvent their legal duty by a few lines of small print in their
insurance policies.
CONCLUSION
The traditional immunity from suit of title companies for
searching the records has withstood almost a century of progress in
30 This standard policy is used by the vast majority of title insurance companies.
For a clause similar to Provision Ten see the form in CALIFORNIA CONTINUING
EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA LAND SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT, 182-87
(1960).
31 California Land Title Association Standard Coverage Policy.
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jurisprudence. The consequences have been suffered by an unfortu-
nate lay public. Society today is more solicitous of the individual's
position and consequently extracts a higher duty from those people
upon whom, because of their callings, others must rely. The present
law of negligent misrepresentation, as many recent cases indicate,
rests on a different philosophy than that of Ultramares v. Touche;
today's courts think less in terms of no liability because the negli-
gent party would thus be exposed "to a liability in an indeterminate
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. '8 2
Rather their concern is more toward one harmed by the negligence of
another, yet without recourse. The recent trend is toward allowing
recourse to third party plaintiffs.
If dicta in recent cases concerning search liability of title com-
panies can be fairly interpreted, it is likely that title companies will
join that growing number of professions, who, as a consequence of
holding themselves out as possessing certain skills, subject them-
selves to a standard of due care to a foreseeable class of plaintiffs.
Title companies should not be permitted to abdicate or circumvent
their legal duty by using their superior bargaining position. Only
one act of negligence on the part of a title company can defeat a
layman's life earnings. It is imperative that the public be provided
with correct information on titles. Liability to third parties is a
certain step in that direction.
Patrick R. McMahon
32 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, -, 174 N.E. 441,
444 (1931).
